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ABSTRACT
Workplace drug testing programs are becoming increasingly more common although there
is little research demonstrating that they have any effect on drug use by employees. This paper
analyzes the deterrence effect of a particularly aggressive workplace drug-testing policy
implemented by the military in 1981.  The military’s policy incorporates random drug testing of
current employees and zero tolerance. Using data from various years of the Department of
Defense’s Worldwide Survey of Health Related Behaviors and the NHSDA, we find illicit drug
prevalence rates among military personnel are significantly lower than civilian rates in years after
the implementation of the program but not before, suggesting a sizeable deterrence effect.  These
basic findings are replicated with data from the NLSY.  The NLSY are also used to explore
sensitivity of the deterrence effect to the probability of detection and severity of punishment,
which varied across military branches during the first few years of the program’s implementation. 
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In recent years both private firms and government agencies have adopted various
programs to combat illegal substance abuse in the workplace.  The percentage of medium- to
large-sized firms that use some form of drug testing nearly doubled in only four years, from 31.9
percent in 1988 to over 62 percent in 1992-93 (Hartwell, et al., 1996).  The use of drug testing by
public sector organizations also has grown in recent years (Felman and Petrini, 1988).  Unlike
most private firms that require only job applicants to submit to drug tests, many public sector
organizations, particularly those involved in public transit and public safety, require regular
random drug testing of current employees.  A few organizations go even further than that by
adopting a policy of “zero tolerance,” which requires dismissal of workers who test positive for
drugs on urinalysis tests.  The goal of such aggressive policies is to impose high enough sanctions
to deter drug use among current and potential users.
Despite the growth in the use of drug testing, little research exists on the effects of these
programs in the workplace.  Assuming rational behavior, drug testing policies should affect
decisions to use illicit substances by increasing the cost of such behavior.  This cost is positively
related to the probability of detection, the probability of punishment given detection, and the
severity of the penalty imposed.  Each of these components is to some extent determined by the
structure of the drug testing program.  In some industries or firms, for example, drug (or alcohol)
tests are administered only when an accident occurs.1  Clearly, the primary goal of such a policy is
to detect those who may have been impaired by illegal substances and punish them accordingly.
The deterrence effects of such ex-post policies will tend to be weaker than when drug testing is
administered randomly to an entire work force.  Even random drug testing strategies, however,
may not be very effective at detecting users.  Borack (1997) shows that, for selected monthly
4testing rates, the expected time until detection of a non-gaming user ranges from one year to as
high as 10 years.  Of course, experienced users can try to “beat” the system by using illicit drugs
at certain low-risk times (like immediately following a drug test), and it has been shown that these
gaming users will generally avoid detection for longer periods (Borack, 1995).  Thus, although
detection is a valuable component of anti-drug programs, especially a drug testing program, it is
not the primary output.  Rather, the main output of such programs is the deterrence of potential
users.  Little research has been done, however, on the effectiveness of drug testing as a deterrent
to either current or potential users.
In this paper we explore the deterrence effect of a particularly aggressive drug-testing
program that has existed in the military since 1981.  The military offers a unique natural
experiment to study the deterrence effect because it imposes mandatory random drug testing on
its current employees, which raises the probability of detection, and it assesses a very high penalty
-- job loss -- on those detected.  This combination of random drug testing and zero tolerance is
relatively rare in the private sector or in other government agencies and is likely to yield the
maximum deterrence effect for alternative feasible drug prevention programs.  However, the cost
of this program can be high due to the costs (recruiting and training costs) of replacing discharged
personnel. Assessing the true magnitude of the deterrence effect is therefore critical for enabling a
more complete assessment of the cost-effectiveness of zero-tolerance policies.
Using data from the National Household Survey of Drug Abuse (NHSDA) and the
Department of Defense’s Worldwide Survey of Health Related Behaviors (DODWWS), we
examine the deterrence effect of the military’s rigid drug program by comparing differences in
illicit drug use between the military population and the civilian population.  Although the civilian
                                                                              
1 For example,in many states a breath test for blood alcohol is administered to drivers involved in a vehicle
accident (see Rhee and Zhang, 1993).
5population is not a clean comparison group because some individuals may be subject to a similarly
aggressive prevention program, the vast majority of the population experiences far less rigid
programs, or none at all.  Data from these two cross sectional studies in 1995 reveal that
significant differences in drug use exist between these two populations, with those in the military
being significantly less likely to report use of an illicit drug in the past year or in the past month.
It is not clear if this difference can be entirely attributed to a deterrence effect of the drug testing
program, however, given that people who decide to join the military know the program is already
in place and may self-select into or away from this occupation.  Further, drug use may be
correlated with unobservable factors that influence an individual’s willingness to serve in the
military, such as patriotism and a strong belief in our nation’s laws.  We, therefore, also examine
data from these two surveys prior to the implementation of the military’s rigid program to assess
whether there were significant differences in drug use patterns before the program existed.
Finally, to more directly assess the issue of selectivity bias, we examine self-reported drug use in
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) both before and after the adoption of the
military’s program.  The use of these longitudinal data enables us to restrict our difference-in-
differences approach to those individuals who are either “continuously in the military” or
“continuously in the civilian population.”
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section II discusses the implementation of
the military’s program beginning in 1981 and how the program currently operates today.  Section
III presents data from the NHSDA and DODWWS surveys to examine both post- and pre-
program differences in drug use between the civilian and military sectors.  Section IV addresses
the same issues using longitudinal data from the NLSY.  Section V provides some insight into the
separate effects of random drug testing versus zero tolerance policies, and Section VI concludes
the paper.
6II. THE MILITARY’S DRUG PREVENTION PROGRAM
The Department of Defense (DoD) first began implementing a urinalysis drug testing
program in 1971 with the original intent of identifying illicit drug users, rehabilitating them, and
returning them to full duty status (Bray et al, 1992).  It was not initially envisioned as a tool for
disciplinary or punitive actions.  When in 1974 the DoD tried to change its approach and use the
results of drug tests for disciplinary and administrative action, these efforts were invalidated by a
Military Court of Appeals ruling.  In 1980, that ruling was reversed and the DoD issued a new
directive updating its original drug testing policy.  The new directive required each of the military
services to enact and operate urinalysis drug testing programs and clearly stated that drug testing
results could be used, with certain restrictions, in punitive or separation proceedings.
Immediately following this new directive, the U.S. Air Force adopted a policy of frequent and
random drug testing.  Further, Air Force commanders were empowered to order spot testing
anytime they felt there was a reasonable suspicion of drug or alcohol abuse.   All of the service
branches adopted a general policy of “zero tolerance,” but these policies were not applied
uniformly to all personnel.  For example, the Army allowed soldiers with less than three years of
service a reprieve from separation proceedings if it was their first offense.2   Similarly, the Navy
and Marine Corps allowed for the possibility of rehabilitation of junior personnel if their problems
were deemed treatable.3  Further, drug testing rates varied across the services. Army commanders
were given the freedom to set their own drug testing rates for members of their command
(Department of the Army, 1988), while commanders in the U.S. Navy and Marines were required
to test 10 to 20 percent of their commands on a monthly basis (Lieb, 1986).  By 1995, however,
                        
2 This was subsequently changed in 1995 so that all Army personnel currently are processed for administrative
separation and disciplinary action.
3 The Navy formally changed its policy to apply strict zero tolerance to all pay grades in 1990.
7all of the services had changed their drug testing strategies to be consistent with each other and
zero-tolerance had become uniformly applied to all personnel.
Despite some initial differences in program implementation, the introduction of the
military's drug program in 1981 was followed by a steady downward trend in illicit drug use
among active duty personnel.  Drug prevalence rates fell from 27.6 percent in 1980 to only 3.4
percent in 1992. (Bray et al, 1995).  The biggest drop occurred between 1980 and 1985 (from
27.6 to 8.9 percent), which spans the period when the Department of Defense (DOD) introduced
and refined its program.  Some analysts have assumed these drops in drug use in the armed forces
were attributable directly to the military’s programs.  However, data from the National Household
Survey of Drug Abuse (NHSDA) shows that past month drug use among civilians also fell during
this period.  Thus, it is difficult to determine whether the drug use reductions were a true program
effect or simply due to changes in drug use patterns among the general youth population from
which the military recruits.
III. ANALYSIS OF NHSDA AND DODWWS DATA
The 1995 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse (NHSDA) is part of a series of
nationwide surveys designed to measure the prevalence of drug use among U.S. households. The
1995 NHSDA is the 15th in a series of studies that began in 1971.  The survey was based on a
stratified, multi-stage area probability sample that provides a nationally representative sample of
the non-institutionalized civilian population 12 years old and older (SAMHSA, 1996).  For the
1995 survey, 115 districts were selected for the first stage of sampling and approximately 22,000
persons were screened for interviewing.  Only 17,747 interviews were completed yielding a
response rate of 80.6 percent.4   In addition to collecting important socioeconomic and
demographic information, each year the NHSDA asks a series of questions pertaining to lifetime,
8annual and thirty-day non-medical use of 11 or more illicit substances including marijuana,
cocaine, crack, inhalants hallucinogens, PCP, heroin, stimulants, sedatives, tranquilizers and
analgesics.  The drug use questions have been developed and tested over time so as to maximize
response rates and minimize reporting biases.  To further reduce reporting bias, the NHSDA uses
self-administered questionnaires for this portion of the household interview.
Although the NHSDA contains some military personnel, this sample is small and not
representative of all uniformed personnel since the sampling frame excludes individuals living on
military installations.  To examine drug use among military personnel, we therefore use the 1995
Department of Defense Worldwide Survey of Health Related Behaviors Among Military
Personnel (DODWWS).  The DODWWS was the sixth in a series of surveys of active-duty
military personnel that started in 1980.  The overall purpose of the series of surveys is to
determine the nature, causes and consequences of substance use and health behavior among
active-duty military personnel and to evaluate the impact of current and future program policies
targeting substance use and health decisions in this population. Included in the survey were 395
questions pertaining to illicit drug, alcohol and tobacco use within the military.  In 1995, the
overall response rate for the eligible population was 69.6 percent. The final 1995 DODWWS data
set consists of 16,193 observations (4,440 Air Force, 4,265 Navy, 3,960 Marine Corps and 3,638
Army). 5
Both of these surveys are based on self-reported data.  Hoyt and Chaloupka (1993) show
that the method of administering these type of surveys can affect the magnitude of reported drug
use.  However, both surveys were self-administered rather than interviewer-administered precisely
                                                                              
4For more on the sampling design and survey administration of the NHSDA, see USDHHS (1996).
5 For a discussion of sampling design and survey administration methods see Bray, Kroutil, and Marsden (1995).
9to minimize underreporting of drug use (Turner, Lessler, and Devore, 1992).  Bray et al. (1995)
discuss specifically the validity of the self-reported DOD survey.
 Two indexes of respondents’ illicit drug use are constructed from both of these surveys,
one reflecting any illicit drug use in the past 12 months and one reflecting any use in the past
month.  These variables measure drug participation rather than the quantity of drugs consumed.
These two analysis variables were selected in part based on the availability of questions that were
asked in both the NHSDA and DODWWS surveys and that were structured the same in both
surveys.  The indexes are based on the prevalence of the nonmedical use of one or more of 11
categories of illegal substances.
Standard demographic characteristics that are available in both surveys and measured the
same in both include gender, marital status, any children, education, age, and race and ethnicity.
Although there are other characteristics that have been shown to be significant correlates with
illicit drug use, such as religious participation, urbanity, and current living arrangements, these
measures are either unavailable in both surveys or not collected in a consistent fashion.
No geographic identifiers were available for respondents in the DODWWS, therefore it is
not possible to include geographic-specific drug price information in the models.  Although
omission of price variables in demand equations represents a specification error, the omission is
unlikely to bias the coefficient of the focus variable, military status, unless military installations are
consistently placed in areas where drug prices are systematically different.  Even if geographic
location information were available, however, constructing a geographic-specific price measure
for military personnel would be problematic due to the high geographic mobility of military
personnel, who often deploy to areas (states or countries) far from their “home” unit.
Furthermore, because our dependent variable is non-drug specific, it is likely that any measure of
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an illicit drug price used would only introduce more measurement error since prices exist only for
particular substances.  No composite price for illicit drugs currently exists.6
Table 1 provides definitions of the analysis variables and the weighted means. The civilian
data from the NHSDA is restricted to 17- to 49-year olds to align civilians with the age groups
represented in the military population.  The restricted civilian sample from the NHSDA, contains
12,012 individuals, and the military sample has 16,067 observations. Table 1 shows that both
current (previous 30 day) drug participation as well as past-year drug participation are
significantly lower among the military population than the civilian population.  However, there are
also a number of demographic differences that may be driving these utilization differences, such as
differences in marital status, age, and level of education, suggesting that multivariate analysis is
needed.  To investigate this further, we pool the two samples and estimate the prevalence of any
illicit drug use in the past month and the past year.
Coefficient estimates from logistic specifications of the probability of using any illicit drug
in the past year and in the past month for the pooled sample of 17- to 49- year olds are recorded
in Table 2.  These estimates show that even after other correlates of illicit drug use are accounted
for, the military sample is still significantly less likely to report using any illicit substance in the
past year or the past month.  The number in brackets shows the marginal effect of being in the
military (evaluated as a change from 0=civilian to 1=military) on the prevalence of any illicit drug
use.  Individuals in the military are approximately 20% less likely to report use in the past year
and 14% less likely to report use in the past  30 days than their civilian counterparts, holding other
factors constant at their mean values.  Although some of this difference may represent the
deterrence effect of the military’s drug testing program, it is not clear that all of it can be
                        
6In addition, personal income is not available in the DODWWS.  Military pay grade is available, which could be
converted to annual income, but pay grade would reflect seniority in the organization more than a true income
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attributable to the program.  For example, it may be that the military population is less willing to
self-report illicit drug use than the civilian population because of the enormous penalty imposed.
Alternatively, it may be the case that military participation is correlated with unobservable factors
that also influence an individual’s willingness to use illicit drugs.
To determine the sensitivity of the estimated program effect to an individual’s willingness
to report drug use, we modify the sample in several ways.  First, we omit all officers and college
graduates from the military sample.  The reason for this restriction is the very low self-reported
drug prevalence rates among officers compared to regular enlistees (Bray et al., 1995).  Military
officers are more indoctrinated into the military culture and have more to lose if they are caught
using illicit substances.  The lower reported use rates among officers, therefore, may in fact
represent true differences in illicit drug use or they may simply reflect an increased unwillingness
to report illicit drug use.   If it is the latter, then restricting the sample to just enlistees should
shrink the difference in reported drug use found between the civilian and military population.  To
align the civilian comparison group more closely with military enlistees, the civilian sample is
restricted to non-college graduate workers in blue-collar occupations (civilians in professional,
technical, and administrative occupations are deleted).    The restricted pooled sample consists of
22,374 observations.
Table 3 presents results from logistic specifications of the same model as in Table 2 for the
restricted sample.  To conserve space only the coefficients of the military dummy variables are
presented. The results are similar to those obtained for the unrestricted sample in Table 3 that
includes officers and white-collar civilian workers.  Column 1 estimates the drug use models for
the 17 to 49 age group to see the effect of the sample restrictions.  A comparison of the
coefficients of the military dummies in column 1 to the coefficients in Table 2 reveals very little
                                                                              
effect.
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change in their size or significance in either of the drug participation models. Columns 2 and 3 of
Table 3 provide estimates of drug use for samples further restricted to 17-34 year olds and 17-25
year olds, respectively.  Even though the restriction to ages 17 to 34 eliminates about 6,000
observations, there is very little difference in the coefficient of the military dummy in column 2.
The sample falls by another 7,000 in column 3 for the youngest sample but, once again, the
program effect remains robust.  That the various age restrictions do not alter the estimated
program effect appears to be due to a fixed relationship between drug participation in the two
sectors over various sub-groups.   We interpret these findings as evidence that the willingness to
underreport is not a major component of the observed differences in illicit drug use between the
civilian and military populations.
The question remains, however, as to whether the large deterrence effect estimated in
Table 2 is biased upward due to selection bias. Drug use among military personnel may be lower
even in the absence of the drug prevention program due to application of the military's entrance
standards and to self selection among applicants.  One way of examining whether this is indeed
the case is to assess the difference in military and civilian drug participation in a period before the
military's drug program took effect.  If adjusted prevalence rates for military personnel are also
lower when no punitive programs were in place (pre-1981), one may infer that the estimated
differences in drug use in 1995 are explained by unobserved differences between the two
populations rather than by a true program effect.  If, on the other hand, military personnel use
drugs at similar, or higher, rates than civilians in the pre-program (pre-1981) year, one may infer
that the prevention program (in 1995) is causally linked to the lower drug use behavior among
military personnel.
To conduct this difference-in-differences analysis we merge data from the 1980
DODWWS and 1979 NHSDA surveys. We were forced to use different survey years for each
13
survey because prior to 1981 there was no single year when both surveys were fielded.   We
choose these two survey years because they immediately preceded  the implementation of the
military’s program and they were two survey years in which the national trend in drug use
remained unchanged (we were at a peak in illicit drug use that started to decline after 1981).  The
specification of the drug use models for the pre-drug program period is similar to those for the
post-drug prevention program period.   However, due to differences in questions asked in the
older DoD surveys (see Burt, et al., 1980), the continuous age variable was replaced by dummies
for age categories, and the presence of children living in the household had to be omitted from the
analysis. Otherwise, model specification is the same as in the 1995 file.
Table 4 provides weighted means for the 1979 NHSDA and 1980 DODWWS data sets.
The data from the 1979 NHSDA are restricted to individuals between the ages of 17 to 49 so as
to align civilians with the age groups of military members.  It appears that current drug
participation still is significantly lower in the military population than in the civilian population,
but the magnitude of the difference is only 1.7 points, substantially smaller than in 1995.
Furthermore, past year participation is significantly higher for military personnel, by 8 points,
suggesting that some of the differences that were observed in 1995 may indeed reflect a program
effect.  However, there are again significant differences in other population characteristics that
may be correlated with these observed differences in utilization rates, so multivariate analysis is
necessary if we want to make any definitive statements.  We, therefore, use the same approach as
before and pool the sample so that we can estimate prevalence rates controlling for other
determinants of demand.
 Table 5 presents coefficient estimates from logistic specifications of the prevalence of past
year and past month use for the pooled 1979/1980 NHSDA/DODWWS data file.  To conserve
space we again report only the coefficients of the military dummies, and only for the restricted
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samples.  Thus, these results can be compared to those in Table 3. Here we find that the
coefficient estimate on the military dummy variable in the past year model is positive but
statistically insignificant.  Further, although the coefficient estimate in the past month model is
negative and statistically significant, it indicates a much smaller difference in magnitude than that
observed in the 1995 sample.  Holding other variables in the model constant at their means, we
find that military personnel are only 3% less likely to report using illicit drugs in the previous
thirty days than the civilian population.   This suggests that the military’s drug testing program has
been extremely successful at deterring drug participation, explaining as much as 80% of the
difference we see in 1995.
These findings are not stable across younger cohorts, however.  Columns 2 and 3 show
what happens to the estimated coefficients when we restrict the sample to ages 17-34 and 17-25,
respectively.  As in column 1, column 2 reveals no significant difference in past-year drug use
between the two populations and that past month use is lower in the armed forces.  However, the
partial effect of the military coefficient in the past month model has risen to 8.3 percentage points
for 17- to 34-year olds.  The most notable difference arises in column 3 for the youngest age
group, 17-25 -- past year drug use is 4.3 points higher for those in the military in 1979/1980 and
the difference is statistically significant.  Current use continues to be lower for enlistees among
17- to 25-year olds and the partial effect of military status is now similar to what it is in the 1995
data.
Overall, the patterns are inconclusive regarding underlying differences in the two
populations.  At least in the full sample, it appears that the differences in past year and past month
participation are significantly smaller in the pre-program sample than they are in the post-program
samples.   However, as we restrict the sample to the younger cohorts and compare civilian blue-
collar workers with military enlistees we find conflicting results based on the dependent variable
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being measured.  Although past year use in the pre-program period is higher among enlistees,
supporting a strong program effect, current (30-day) drug participation is significantly lower
among enlistees.  The difference in differences estimate based on the 30-day prevalence measures
falls to about 4 percentage points (10.12 – 14.97 = - 4.85), suggesting that only about one-third
of the difference in prevalence can be attributed to the military’s stringent drug testing program.
One interpretation of the shrinking difference-in-differences estimates is that self selection is
greater among the youngest age groups.
IV. DETERRENCE EFFECTS IN THE NLSY
Part of the inconsistency in findings reported in the previous analysis may have to do with
inherent limitations of cross-sectional data.   When considering the impact of a policy change on
the behavior of those in the military, cross-sectional data cannot account for entry and exit from
the sample of interest over time.  Further, given the long time lag between periods being
evaluated, there may have been changes in the recruiting strategy employed by the military that
would make the military population more or less like the civilian population over time in ways we
have not measured. We therefore thought it would be useful to see if we could replicate our
findings of a deterrence effect using longitudinal data from the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth (NLSY).
There are several advantages of using the NLSY for evaluating the deterrence effect of the
military’s drug testing program.  First, because the NLSY tracks the same individuals over time, it
is possible to separate people who choose to leave the military after the military’s drug testing
program went into place with those people who choose to stay.   We can therefore evaluate how
drug use patterns change for those entering and exiting the military, thus making it possible to
isolate the deterrence effect to some extent from the selection effect.  Second, we can track how
individuals who choose to stay in the military change their drug use over time given the
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implementation of the military’s drug testing program and compare this with changes in the
civilian population during the same time period.  Finally, the NLSY contains a richer set of
demographic and background characteristics that enable us to obtain a better specification of the
individual’s demand function.  Variables omitted from the earlier analysis that can now be
accounted for include parental education, a measure of cognitive ability (AFQT scores), and
mother’s work status while the respondent was growing up.
The NLSY’s advantages are countered by a major disadvantage -- drug use is not
collected in every survey year.  Although an extensive array of drug use questions were asked in
1984, 1988, and 1992, only the 1980 survey contains information on illicit drug use prior to
implementation of the military’s program.   Further, the 1980 survey only asked use of marijuana
in the previous year.  It contains no information on the use of other illicit substances.  Since we
cannot construct a measure of any illicit drug participation for both a pre-program and post-
program year, annual marijuana use is analyzed instead.  Given that marijuana is by far the most
widely used illicit drug, this change in the dependent variable should not have a dramatic effect on
our ability to identify a deterrence effect.
The two years chosen for analysis, 1980 and 1984, straddle the change in the military's
drug policy, which occurred in 1981.  Descriptive statistics for the civilian and military samples in
the 1984 NLSY are presented in the Appendix.  In both populations, the vast majority of people
who report using any illicit drug in the previous year also report using marijuana in the previous
year, suggesting that limiting our analysis to past-year marijuana use should not jeopardize our
ability to find a deterrence effect.  The appendix also shows that in 1984 statistically significant
differences exist between the military and civilian populations in all of our measures of illicit drug
use.   For example, military personnel are only half as likely to report using marijuana in the
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previous year as the civilian population.  The question is whether this difference in utilization rates
existed before the military’s strict drug testing program.
An important first step in answering this question is determining whether the sample
changed before and after the program was introduced and whether those changes are correlated
with marijuana use.  Approximately 54.3% of those who were in the military in 1980 were still
serving in the military in 1984, so approximately 46% of 1980 military personnel separated from
the military during the four years.  Among the 1980 civilian sample, 93.7% remained civilians
during this four year period, while the remaining 6.3% decided to join the military during the
intervening period.
Table 6 provides a break down of marijuana prevalence rates by transition status.  The
overall use rate for military members in 1984 was 17.9 percent.  This compared to a prevalence
rate of 32.5 percent for civilians, a difference of 14.6 points.  However, the military group
included individuals who entered the military between 1980 and 1984 and the civilian group
included veterans who left the military during this period.  If we compare prevalence rates in 1984
between those who were continuously in the military during the period versus those who were
continuously civilians the difference becomes somewhat larger, 18.7 points (32 percent versus
13.3 percent). Marjuana use in 1980 had a different pattern, with the military sample reporting
higher annual prevalence of marijuana use than those in the civilian sector (56.5% and 45.8%,
respectively).  However, if we limit the samples to those who remained in the military to those
who remained civilian, this difference in prevalence rates drops substantially, with the military
population reporting use rates of 48.5% and the civilian population reporting use rates of 45.9%.
The group that left the military after 1980 had the highest annual prevalence, as one might expect.
There are other suggestive differences for the various transition groups.  Use rates
dropped between 1980 and 1984 for all groups.  However, the drop was the greatest for
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continuous military personnel, from 48.5 percent to only 13.3 percent (a drop of 35.2 points),
followed by those who entered the military during the period (a drop of 27.1 points).  By
comparison, continuous civilians reduced marijuana use by only 7.1 percentage points.   As was
already mentioned, those who initially were on active duty in 1980 but who later separated had
the highest use rates of any group (61.9%).  Their usage dropped in 1984 but not by as much as
those who remained on active duty.  This suggests that some drug users in the military may have
been induced to leave by the new drug policies.  Similarly, civilians who enlisted during the period
had a much larger drop in marijuana use, as compared to continuous civilians.
Logistic specifications of annual prevalence of marijuana use for 1980 (column1) and 1984
(column 2) are presented in Table 7.  In 1980, the year before the military’s drug policy was
introduced, there is no significant difference in self-reported annual marijuana prevalence between
the civilian and military sectors.  However, by 1984 it appears clear that the military's drug
prevention program had reduced drug participation; marijuana use among military personnel in
1984 was 20% below that of civilians. This is consistent with the program effect estimated above
using the 1995 NHSDA-DODWWS data [see Table 2].  These results suggest that the adjusted
military-civilian marijuana participation differential has remained relatively steady over the decade
since the inception of the military’s strict anti-drug policies.
As previously discussed, the composition of the military sample changes between 1980
and 1984.  Estimates of the program effect calculated from the regressions presented in Table 7
may be biased by individual decisions to enter or leave the military over time. One way to
overcome this limitation is to remove from the sample those who transition between the military
and civilian sectors.  We therefore re-ran our analysis on a restricted sample of individuals who
remained in either the military or the civilian population between 1980 and 1984.  We find that the
coefficient estimate on the military dummy variable in 1980 remains fairly stable and insignificant.
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The estimated coefficient on the military dummy variable in 1984 becomes –1.085 and remains
significant at the 0.01 level.  The marginal effect of –23.7% is slightly larger than the estimate of
20.2% presented in Table 7, suggesting that the programmatic effect of the military’s drug testing
program is even larger than previously estimated.  It should be stressed, however, that marijuana
use is measured for the past year.  These basic results were also observed in the NHSDA/DoD
data for past year illicit drug use, but not for current drug use.
V. THE EFFECT OF  DIFFERENCES IN DETECTION AND PUNISHMENT
PROBABILITIES
As note above in Section II, by 1995 all of the military branches had adopted similar drug
prevention policies that incorporated both random drug testing and dismissal of all members
testing positive for illicit drugs.  This policy is much more stringent than programs found in most
private firms and government agencies.  However, in 1984 the military’s policies were still
evolving and somewhat less stringent than they are today (see Leib, 1996; Martinez, 1999).   In
addition, the policies created differences in the probabilities of detection and punishment across
service branches within the military.
In this section we rely on natural differences that arose in the implementation of anti-drug
policies in the military.  Although all branches implemented some form of drug testing after 1981,
not all immediately adopted zero tolerance.  In particular, all branches allowed junior enlisted
personnel (in pay grades 1 through 3) who tested positive to continue their careers (a “two-
strikes” policy) under certain conditions.  Considerable discretion was given to local commanders,
and only senior enlisted and officers were subject to automatic termination.  Another difference
was that testing rates in the Army were lower than in the other branches. Due to the widespread
“two-strikes” policy for junior personnel, which reduced the probability of punishment for this
group, we would expect any deterrence effect of overall military policies to be smaller in 1984
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than in 1995.  Also, we would expect deterrence effects to be the lowest in the Army, which had a
lower probability of detection owing to a lower testing rate.  Since the military sample in the
NLSY consists of junior enlisted, we use the NLSY to test for these hypothesized differences. We
estimate three drug participation models, one for current illicit drug participation, one for any past
year participation, and one for past year marijuana participation.  The model contains dummies for
each military branch rather than a single military dummy.  The results are displayed in Table 8.7
The results in Table 8 reveal striking differences in the estimated overall deterrent effect
attributed to military polices in 1984 and 1995, and deterrence among the four service branches.
The size of the overall military coefficient in 1984 is -.886 for past year drug use, which is 20-40
percent lower than the range reported for 1995 past year participation in Tables 2 and 3.
Similarly, 1984 past month drug participation is considerably lower than the estimates in Tables 2
and 3.  Furthermore, the magnitude of the negative coefficient for the Army in 1984 is between
one-third and one-half the size of the coefficients of the other branches in 1984.
The military drug prevention program in effect in 1984 was closer qualitatively to those
currently being used by civilian employers.8  Thus, these results suggest the potential size of the
deterrence effect for policies that are closer to those currently in use by civilian employers. If we
assume that the results for the Army provide a lower bound estimate of this effect, due to the
lower detection risk and lighter punishment, then a deterrence effect of about 10 percent could be
expected from the programs in civilian firms.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.
                        
7 We are not able to use the 1995 NHDA/DODWWS data file for this test because by 1995 service policy
differences had blurred.
8For example, local government transportation workers can be subject to pre-employmnent, random, and post-
accident alcohol and drug testing.  Those who test positive may be referred to treatment and rehabilitation.
Although termination of employment is one outcome, it is used rarely.  The most severe penalty appears to be
transfer of an employee to jobs that are not ‘safety-sensitive.’
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Using the U.S. military’s policy of random drug testing and zero tolerance, we find that a
strict employer anti-drug program is a highly effective means of deterring illicit drug use both
among current users as well as potential users.  However, the size of the deterrence effect varies
considerably depending on which age group, which drug use measure, and which data set is used.
In the NHSDA/DoD surveys past year drug participation in the military is as much as 16% lower
than in the civilian sector for the program year (1995); furthermore, it appears that selection bias
does not account for much of this effect.  Analysis of  NLSY data on past year marijuana use
reinforce these results.  However, civilian-military differences in past month use among younger
age groups appear to be more heavily affected by selection bias, which may account for as much
as 70 percent of the estimated deterrence effect.  Based on these considerations, the deterrence
effect for the military program would range between 4% and 16%.
It is interesting to note that even the strictest workplace anti-drug program cannot
eliminate illicit drug use among employees.  Although drug participation rates in the military are
low, they are not zero.  This raises the question as to whether or not such strict anti-drug
programs are worth their cost. The primary cost of  zero tolerance is the cost of replacing
terminated workers.  The program the military used in 1984 involved a two-strikes policy, and in
the case of the Army, lower random testing rates, yet still produced a sizeable deterrence effect.
These results suggest that policies that would be feasible today in the private sector can be
expected to reduce drug use in a cost-effective manner.
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= 1 if respondent reports using any illicit drug
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Notes: Restricted to ages 17-49.  All data are weighted
Military sample = 16,067; civilian sample = 12,012
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Table 2. Logit Estimates of Any Illicit Drug Participation, 1995
(Ages 17-49)
















































Log likelihood 1254.4 765.6
     N 28,075 28,020
Notes:  Merged 1995 NHSDA/DODWWS data.
            a Standard errors are in parentheses.
            bPartial effects in brackets.
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     N 22,374 16,142 9,112
Notes:  Based on merged 1995 NHSDA/DODWWS data.  For full model specification
            see Table 3.
             a Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
             bPartial effects in brackets.
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= 1 if respondent reports using any illicit drug

































































Notes: Restricted to ages 17 - 49.  All data are weighted.
Military sample = 15,268; civilian sample = 4,624
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Table 5. Logit Estimates of Military Coefficient in Drug Participation Models,





























     N 19,149 15,809 10,777
Notes:  Based on merged 1979 NHSDA/1980 DODWWS file.  For full model specification see Table 3.
            aStandard errors are reported in parenthesis.
            bPartial effects in brackets.
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Table 6. Marijuana Use Rates By Transition Status, NLSY Data










Stayed Military .485 (.500) .132 (.340) -.353
Stayed Civilian .458 (.498) .320 (.466) -.138
Entered Military .504 (.500) .234 (.424) -.270
Left Military .618 (.486) .406 (.491) -.212
Mil. 1984 -- .179 (.383) --
Civ. 1984 -- .325 (.468) --
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a Standard errors in parenthesis
b Marginal effects in brackets
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Notes:  For full model specification see Table 7 (column 2)
a Standard error in parentheses
b Partial effect in brackets
c From Table 7, column 2
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a t-test of difference in means = 9.301(p=.0001)
b t-test of difference in means = 8.895(p=.0001)
c t-test of difference in means  = 8.056(p=.0000)




